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• Around the world, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
con9nue to serve important purposes in many 
economies
• Some of the fastest growing economies such as 
China, Vietnam, or South Korea have used SOEs to 
drive recent economic growth
• SOEs are used by many countries around the world 
for policy burdens, which vary from profit 
maximiza9on
Introduc,on into SOEs / Goal
This analysis will u9lize a difference in difference in difference model which uses dummy variables and interac9on terms to
measure the effects of Vietnam’s 2007 WTO entrance on State-Owned Enterprises. This allows analysis to be performed on 
the effect that inherent differences between two groups using dummy variables and interac9on terms between them.  Thus, 
the equa9on is as follows:
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!" = 𝛽# + 𝛽$ ∗ 𝑊𝑇𝑂! + 𝛽% ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐸! + 𝛽& ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅!"+ 𝛽& ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅!"* 𝑆𝑂𝐸!+ 𝛽& ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅!"*𝑊𝑇𝑂"+ 𝛽& ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅!"* 𝑆𝑂𝐸! + 𝛽& ∗ 𝑇𝐴𝑅!"* 𝑆𝑂𝐸! ∗ 𝑊𝑇𝑂" + 𝛽$ ∗ 𝑋!" + 𝜖!"
where WTO is a dummy for the year 2007, TAR is a dummy for firms that experience a large change in tariffs aQer 2007, SOE 
is a dummy for state ownership, and X is the variables that capture firm level fixed effects (i) across years (t).
Advantages and Disadvantages of a 
Policy Burden
When might a state-owned enterprise’s policy burden be a beneficial?
In the event of trade liberalization, there would be a significant negative effect in employment on companies that now have 
to deal with increased competition from foreign firms. Because SOEs have a policy burden to employ, a soft budget 
constraint, and are favored by government policies, they will decrease employment less than a privatized company would. 
The opposite would apply with gains of trade as SOEs would not get to gain as much from trade as a private company would
Research Ques,on and Hypothesis  
Data used for analysis was gathered from: 
The Vietnam Enterprise Survey from the World Bank 
Microdata Library for years 2000 – 2014. This 
contains firm level data for all enterprises larger than 
10 employees and a sample of those with less than 
10 employees
Data on Tariffs for Vietnam was given every other 
year from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solu9on(WITS) Database 
Total Factor Produc9vity was calculated using both 
Olley-Pakes two step es9ma9on and an OLS Fixed 
Effects es9ma9on and performed using two different 
methods
Data Sources and Analysis
Results
To accomplish their policy burdens, SOEs are given 
certain benefits:
• SOE’s typically have be_er access to industrial 
subsidies and tax holidays
• SOE’s have be_er credit that allows them 
preferen9al access to loans and lower interest 
rates than private enterprises (PE’s)
• SOE’s use a soQ budget constraint which can allow 
the organiza9on to sustain losses because the 
government will fit the bill
However, many of these benefits have nega9ve 
consequences on the firm:
• By a_emp9ng to achieve a goal other than profit 
maximiza9on, it becomes difficult to evaluate 
managers and determine causes of inefficacy
• SOEs typically perform worse than private 
enterprises in terms of typical financial 
performance measures, such as return on 
investment
• The soQ budget constraint means that poor 
performance is paid for by taxpayers or the federal 
or state governments 
• Alloca9ng Industrial subsides to firms that do not 
return as much on investment is a misalloca9on of 
resources
• Prone to corrup9on and other forms of 
mismanagement
Model and Equa,on
Figure 1. Average Revenue for a Firm by Ownership
Figure 2. Average Employees per Firm by Ownership
Table 1. Descrip;ve Sta;s;cs
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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• State ownership in Vietnam has a posi9ve and 
significant effect on a firm’s employment
• AQer entrance in the WTO, many SOEs saw a decline in 
employment, especially in tariff affected industries
• This might be a result of SOE reforms set in place 
by the government that consolidated many SOEs 
into SOE groups. This caused many SOE’s to close 
doors
• PE’s increased employment aQer entrance to the WTO, 
especially those in industries that decreased tariffs 
significantly.
• Industries with affected-tariffs did not have higher 
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Mean Tariffs by Year 
Figure 3: Average Tariff for all industries by year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES employment employment employment log emp log emp log emp
WTOdummy 30.50*** 41.12*** 45.45*** -0.233*** -0.132*** -0.108***
(7.085) (10.83) (10.99) (0.00971) (0.0110) (0.0110)
SOEdummy 48.44*** 47.07*** 57.81*** 0.0435 -0.00835 0.0505*
(9.807) (12.99) (12.68) (0.0297) (0.0274) (0.0259)
Tardummy 7.629 21.32 -11.42 0.0199 0.104 -0.0755
(10.41) (19.77) (17.05) (0.0556) (0.0758) (0.0603)
TARxSOE 54.39* 84.01** 79.09** 0.0340 0.0324 0.00555
(30.00) (35.32) (34.95) (0.0389) (0.0377) (0.0349)
TARxWTO 13.42 39.45** 37.63** -0.0267*** -0.0251** -0.0350***
(9.564) (17.80) (17.78) (0.00996) (0.00979) (0.0102)
SOExWTO -43.49*** -55.73*** -59.70*** 0.00853 0.0162 -0.00548
(16.23) (20.07) (20.15) (0.0179) (0.0157) (0.0156)
SOExWTOxTAR -63.84* -99.43** -98.95** -0.00840 -0.0342 -0.0316
(33.41) (41.16) (41.02) (0.0268) (0.0258) (0.0237)
loginc 64.14*** 69.02*** 68.27*** 0.417*** 0.303*** 0.299***
(3.327) (5.984) (6.220) (0.00686) (0.0103) (0.0111)
logliab 1.913* -2.664 -5.660** 0.0275*** 0.00469* -0.0116***
(1.065) (2.588) (2.660) (0.00231) (0.00281) (0.00315)
logrev 20.38*** 116.2*** 94.58*** 0.149*** 0.634*** 0.514***
(2.012) (9.364) (7.125) (0.00486) (0.0202) (0.0166)
age -0.0202 0.446 0.317 -0.00143*** -0.000558 -0.00126***
(0.479) (0.591) (0.589) (0.000513) (0.000493) (0.000453)
TFPOLS -103.2*** -0.566***
(9.380) (0.0218)
year = 2006 13.85*** 15.02* 15.52** 0.0240*** 0.0294*** 0.0322***
(4.671) (7.904) (7.894) (0.00594) (0.00726) (0.00682)
year = 2008 -40.01*** -38.58*** -38.49*** 0.111*** 0.0769*** 0.0776***
(6.638) (8.629) (8.661) (0.00571) (0.00655) (0.00669)
year = 2010 -30.81*** -26.82*** -26.21*** 0.0870*** 0.0685*** 0.0720***
(5.006) (7.785) (7.753) (0.00561) (0.00601) (0.00626)
year = 2012 -15.70*** -3.031 -3.075 0.0465*** 0.0360*** 0.0359***
(3.233) (7.010) (6.990) (0.00531) (0.00554) (0.00585)
year = 2014, omitted - - - - - -
TFPOP -80.96*** -0.443***
(6.211) (0.0178)
Constant -728.6 -1,949 -1,728 0.100 -1.162 0.0437
(963.3) (1,197) (1,192) (1.030) (0.990) (0.914)
Observations 60,943 30,419 30,419 60,941 30,419 30,419
R-squared 0.035 0.066 0.066 0.515 0.738 0.736
Number of firmid 17,881 11,655 11,655 17,881 11,655 11,655
